

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 156354
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:EUR/SOV:ABOHLN
APPROVED BY:EUR/SOV:SMCCALL
S/S:DSCOTT

-----004910 202222Z /73

R 201733Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000

S E C R E T STATE 156354

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT HELSINKI 1897 ACTION SECSTATE INFO CIA WASHDC NASA W
ASHDC SECDEF WAHSDC
JCS WAHSDC JUNE 16

QUOTE S E C R E T HELSINKI 1897
EXDIS

US ASAT DELEGATION 0012

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT

NASA FOR KRUEGER

E. O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: ASAT TALKS: FOURTH PLENARY, JUNE 14, 1978

SUMMARY. AT FOURTH PLENARY, BUCHHEIM SAID US BELIEVES
THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO WORK OUT TWO-PART UNDER-
STANDING WHILE CONTINUING DISCUSSION ON ELEMENTS OF COM-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 156354

PREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. ONE PART WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF
PROHIBITING CERTAIN ACTS AGAINST SATELLITES, AND OTHER
PART WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF SUSPENDING TESTING OF ASAT
SYSTEMS AGAINST OBJECTS IN SPACE. KHLESTOV EMPHASIZED
THESE TALKS ARE PRELIMINARY, AND THAT SOVIET SIDE WANTS TO
UNDERSTAND US POSITION. PRELIMINARY SOVIET ESTIMATION
IS THAT US AND USSR HAVE MAY COINCIDING VIEWS ON

POSSIBLE AGREEMENT PROHIBITING HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST SATELLITES, AND THAT THE TWO SIDES CAN WORK OUT AN INDEPENDENT AGREEMENT ON THIS. THIS WOULD NOT HINDER DISCUSSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT LIMITING ASAT DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT, AND SHOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT ON PROGRESS IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS.

KHLESTOV RAISED QUESTION OF USE OF A SYSTEM WHICH ITSELF IS NOT AN ASAT (E.G., SHUTTLE) AS MEANS OF DELIVERY OF ASAT SYSTEM INTO SPACE. HE ASKED HOW US WOULD DEAL WITH SUCH "INDIRECT" MEANS OF COMMITTING HOSTILE ACTS. KHLESTOV ALSO ASKED WHAT SYSTEMS WOULD BE COVERED BY HOSTILE ACTS AGREEMENT: WAS US REFERRING ONLY TO SPACE OBJECTS, OR ALSO TO EARTH-BASED COMPONENTS, INCLUDING LAUNCHING AND RADIO-TECHNICAL FACILITIES? DID US MEAN SPECIALIZED ASAT SYSTEMS OR ALSO SYSTEMS FOR DUAL USE? KHLESTOV ALSO ASKED AGAIN FOR US VIEWS ON VERIFICATION, PARTICULARLY OUR MENTION OF "COOPERATIVE MEASURES."

BUCHHEIM SAID US VIEW OF HOSTILE ACTS AGREEMENT IS THAT IT WOULD BE A COMMITMENT, WITHOUT REGARD TO MEANS, NOT TO COMMIT CERTAIN ACTS AGAINST OBJECTS LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE. HE ALSO SAID US SIDE RECOGNIZED THAT, IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, WE MAY NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SYSTEMS DEVELOPED SPECIFICALLY FOR ASAT PURPOSES AND THOSE DESIGNED FOR OTHER PURPOSES WHICH HAVE INCIDENTAL ASAT CAPABILITY; RAISED QUESTION OF DISMANTLING EXIST-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 156354

ING ASAT CAPABILITIES, AND ASKED KHLESTOV IF HE HAD ANY VIEWS ON HOW THIS SHOULD BE DONE; ANND EXPRESSED US INTEREST IN EXPLANATION BY THE SOVIET SIDE FOR THEIR TESTING OF ORBITAL INTERCEPTOR. MEETING ADJOURNED AFTER FOUR HOURS. NEXT MEETING THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1978. END SUMMARY

1. AT FOURTH PLENARY, HELD AT SOVIET EMBASSY JUNE 14, BUCHHEIM OPENINED WITH PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTTEL).

2. KHLESTOV EMPHASIZED THAT TWO SIDES ARE HERE FOR PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS, AND THE PRIMARY SOVIET ERRAND IS TO UNDERSTAND US APPROACH AND GIVE SOVIET ESTIMATION OF IT. HE SAID US SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD MANY IDEAS IN A CONCRETE WAY; NOW THE SOVIET SIDE CAN GIVE PRELIMINARY ESTIMATIONS. HE SAID THE TWO SIDES HAVE A COMMON APPROACH ON HOSTILE ACTS; MANY ELEMENTS OF THE US APPROACH COINCIDE WITH SOVIET VIEWS; THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT AN INDEPENDENT AGREEMENT ON HOSTILE ACTS; IT WILL NOT HINDER CONSULTATIONS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM; ITS SIGNING, COMING INTO FORCE, AND REGISTERING MUST NOT BE DEPENDENT ON

OTHER PROBLEMS OR THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS ON THOSE PROBLEMS.

3. KHESTOV ASKED IF THE US VISUALIZED THAT, UNDER A HOSTILE ACTS AGREEMENT, THE SHUTTLE WOULD NOT BE USED FOR HOSTILE ACTS AND ALSO THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USED FOR DELIVERY INTO SPACE OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS OR TO ASSIST IN THE COMMITTING OF HOSTILE ACTS. BUCHHEIM SAID THAT IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT THERE WOULD BE A GENERAL COMMITMENT, WITHOUT REGARD TO MEANS, NOT TO COMMIT HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST OBJECTS LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE. BUCHHEIM NOTED THAT THERE ARE SOVIET SYSTEMS, SUCH AS SOYUZ AND THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM, WHICH COULD BE USED DIRECTLY OR

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 156354

INDIRECTLY FOR HOSTILE ACTS. A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO CARRY OUT CERTAIN KINDS OF ACTIONS AGAINST SPACE OBJECTS REGARDLESS OF MEANS, AND SUITABLE ELEMENTS TO LIMIT THE MEANS FOR CARRYING OUT SUCH ACTS. THE US ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE SPACE SHUTTLE WOULD NOT BE USED FOR HOSTILE ACTS, BUT WE WILL NOT PARTICULARIZE AN AGREEMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE SHUTTLE; IT IS NOT AN ASAT SYSTEM. WE WILL NOT ASK THE USSR TO PARTICULARIZE AN AGREEMENT NOT TO CARRY OUT HOSTILE ACTS WITH REFERENCE TO, FOR EXAMPLE, SOYUZ.

4. KHESTOV ASKED IF US MEANT THAT ALL SPACE MEANS, INCLUDING SHUTTLE, WOULD FALL UNDER OBLIGATION, WHETHER THEY MIGHT BE USED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FOR ASAT PURPOSES. WOULD LAUNCHING INTO SPACE OF ASAT MEANS ALSO BE PROHIBITED? BUCHHEIM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE QUESTION TO BE, WOULD THE US LAUNCH INTO SPACE EQUIPMENT FOR COMMITTING HOSTILE ACTS. KHESTOV SAID ACTS AND ASSISTANCE IN THE COMMITMENT OF SUCH ACTS. BUCHHEIM SAID THE TWO SIDES WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO PERFORM CERTAIN ACTS; THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANCE TO WHAT MEANS MIGHT BE USED. KHESTOV ARGUED, WITHOUT CITING SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, THAT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OFTEN PROHIBIT BOTH ACTIONS AND ASSISTING ACTIONS. BUCHHEIM SAID THE US RECOGNIZED THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO FIND A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY WAY OF LIMITING THE MEANS FOR CARRYING OUT THE ACTS IN QUESTION. A GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE TO CONSTRUCT AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ENSURE THAT NEITHER PARTY WILL HAVE AN ASAT SYSTEM. UNDER A PROPER COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT, THE QUESTION RAISED BY THE SOVIET SIDE DOES NOT ARISE AS A

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 156354

PRACTICAL PROBLEM. UNDER A REGIME WHICH PROHIBITS ONLY THE CARRYING OUT OF HOSTILE ACTS, THERE WOULD ALWAYS BE THE UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY THE EXISTENCE OF MEANS TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTS.

5. BUCHHEIM SAID THE US SIDE HAS A LACK OF AFFECTION FOR COMPLETE SOVIET ATTENTION TO THE SHUTTLE, WHICH IS NOT AN ASAT SYSTEM. THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY OF LAUNCHING ASAT DEVICES BY ANY SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM OF EITHER SIDE. THE US SIDE COULD ASK, WOULD THE USSR USE SALYUT TO ASSIST IN THE PLACEMENT INTO SPACE OR FUNCTIONING OF AN ASAT DEVICE? KHLESTOV SAID THE US HAS THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET QUESTION.

6. BUCHHEIM SAID TWO GENERAL CASES SHOULD BE ANALYZED: (1) THE SITUATION UNDER AN AGREEMENT NOT TO CARRY OUT HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST THE SPACE OBJECTS OF THE OTHER SIDE; (2) THE SITUATION UNDER AN AGREEMENT PROHIBITING HOSTILE ACTS PLUS THE ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS ON THE MEANS TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTS. THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET SIDE IS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIRST CASE. BEYOND THAT OBLIGATION, THERE WOULD BE NO UNDERSTANDING ABOUT MEANS. EACH SIDE WOULD BE FREE TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY MEANS AS IT DECIDED AND WAS ABLE; UNDER THE REGIME, THE US WOULD DO ANY AND ALL THINGS PERMITTED WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO CARRY OUT. OUR STRONG PREFERENCE IS TO CONSTRUCT AGREED LIMITS ON DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF MEANS; BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO ACQUIRE ASAT MEANS IF THERE IS NOT AN AGREEMENT TO REFRAIN FROM DOING SO.

7. KHLESTOV ASKED IF THE US CAN ACCEPT A COMMITMENT NOT TO COMMIT DIRECT OR INDIRECT HOSTILE ACTS, THAT IS, NOT TO ASSIST OR FACILITATE THE COMMITMENT OF SUCH AN ACT. BUCHHEIM SAID THE SOVIET SIDE ASKED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 156354

WHETHER THE US IS PREPARED NOT TO USE CERTAIN EQUIPMENT. THE USSR HAS TESTED ASAT SYSTEMS. WE DON'T KNOW ALL ABOUT THIS SYSTEM; PERHAPS THE SOVIET SIDE WILL TELL US. THE ACTIVE PART IS LAUNCHED INTO SPACE BY A VEHICLE. WOULD THE USSR BE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT NOT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE OR FACILITATION BY AGREEING NOT TO LAUNCH ASAT EQUIPMENT INTO OUTER

SPACE? THIS QUESTION IS SIMILAR TO THE QUESTION THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ASKED: WOULD THE SOVIETS AGREE TO AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO CARRY OUT HOSTILE ACTS AND NOT TO LAUNCH INTO SPACE THE MEANS FOR COMMITTING HOSTILE ACTS. KHESTOV SAID HE WAS NOT A SPECIALIST AND WOULD NOT GO INTO TECHNICAL DETAILS. IF THE US FOLLOWS THE APPROACH OF PROHIBITING NOT ONLY DIRECT BUT ALSO INDIRECT ACTION, THAT WOULD BE THE SOVIET POSITION ALSO. THIS COULD BE STATED AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE. BUCHHEIM SAID THIS IS AN IDEA WORTH CONSIDERING FURTHER.

8. KHESTOV SAID THE US PROPOSAL ON LIMITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASAT SYSTEMS WAS NEW FOR THE SOVIETS, WHO HAD NOTED THAT IT CONTAINED INTERESTING IDEAS DESERVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. HE ASKED WHAT THE US MEANT BY "SPECIALIZED" ASAT SYSTEMS. DOES THE US MEAN JUST THE SPACE OBJECT, OR ALSO THE LAUNCHING FACILITIES? WHAT ABOUT THE DEVICES USED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THOSE SYSTEMS AND WHICH CAN BE USED AT THE SAME TIME FOR OTHER SYSTEMS?

9. BUCHHEIM REITERATED THE US GOAL OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT INCLUDING THE ELEMENT THAT BOTH SIDES FOREGO THE MEANS FOR CARRYING OUT HOSTILE ACTS. THE US SIDE RECOGNIZES THAT THERE ARE, IN PRINCIPLE, TWO KINDS OF ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL EQUIPMENT TO BE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 156354

CONSIDERED FOR LIMITATION. THE FIRST CLASS IS DESIGNED AND BROUGHT INTO BEING FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF ASAT ACTIVITY. THE SECOND CLASS IS MADE UP OF ALL THOSE THINGS WHICH, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR CHARACTERISTICS, MAY HAVE SOME INCIDENTAL ABILITY TO CARRY OUT ANTI-SATELLITE ACTS BUT WHICH ARE DESIGNED AND USED FOR DIFFERENT, NON-ASAT PURPOSES. THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY SYSTEMS WHICH ARE DESIGNED AND BROUGHT INTO BEING FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF ATTACKING SPACE OBJECTS. THE ELEMENTS OF AN APPROPRIATE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE UNDERTAKINGS NOT TO BRING SUCH SYSTEMS INTO BEING, AND TO DISMANTLE OR DESTROY ANY SUCH SYSTEMS ALREADY IN BEING. THE US SIDE ALSO WANTS TO CUT OFF THE PROLIFERATION OF SYSTEMS WHICH WILL BE EVER MORE POTENT AND DIFFICULT TO CONTROL. THIS GOAL WILL REQUIRE THE ELIMINATION OF ALL SPECIFIC ASAT SYSTEMS. THE SECOND CLASS IS MADE UP OF ALL THOSE THINGS USED BY BOTH SIDES, SOMETIMES JOINTLY, TO CARRY ON EXTENSIVE ACTIVITIES IN SPACE. AS LONG AS BOTH OF US POSSESS AND USE EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATIONS IN OUTER SPACE, BOTH WILL POSSESS SOME MEANS FOR ACTS AGAINST SATELLITES. THIS ABILITY

IS INHERENT TO SOME DEGREE IN SPACE SYSTEMS BUILT FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES, BUT IS FAR LESS THAN IN SYSTEMS DESIGNED FOR ASAT PURPOSES. WE WANT TO SEE THE EXTIRPATION OF EXISTING ASATS SYSTEMS AND AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO DEPLOY NEW AND IMPROVED ASAT SYSTEMS. WITH SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN PLACE IT IS STILL CONCEIVABLE THAT ONE SIDE MAY FEEL THE OTHER RETAINS, IN THE GENERAL BODY OF ITS SPACE CAPABILITIES, SOME UNDESIRABLE DEGREE OF POTENTIAL TO CARRY OUT HOSTILE ACTS. IF SO, THAT WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES. PERHAPS WE COULD ARRANGE TO ATTEND TO IT FROM TIME TO TIME; CIRCUMSTANCES AND TECHNOLOGY WILL CHANGE. A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT COULD INVOLVE SETTING UP A PROBLEM-SOLVING MECHANISM THROUGH WHICH

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 156354

ONE PARTY COULD EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE OTHER'S ACTIVITIES. WE CANNOT VISUALIZE CONSTRUCTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY VALID FOR ALL TIME WITHOUT ELABORATION OR CHANGE. IN SUMMARY, WE RECOGNIZE TWO CLASSES OF SYSTEMS. FIRST, SPECIFIC ASAT SYSTEMS; THESE SHOULD BE ELIMINATED AND THERE SHOULD BE A FIRM UNDERTAKING NOT TO BRING INTO BEING NEW ASAT SYSTEMS. SECOND, THE VAST INVENTORY OF OTHER SPACE ASSETS IN THE HANDS OF BOTH SIDES. THE FIRST CLASS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH DIRECTLY; ITEMS IN THE SECOND CLASS CAN BE DEALT WITH IF AND AS QUESTIONS ARISE ABOUT THEM. ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER MAY HAVE A SPECIFIC ASAT SYSTEM WITH COMPONENT ELEMENTS THAT ARE ALSO USED IN SYSTEMS WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH ASAT; FOR EXAMPLE, RADIO TECHNICAL DEVICES. WE REALIZE THAT A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT CANNOT INVOLVE THE ELIMINATION OF ABSOLUTELY EVERY ELEMENT OF ALL ASAT SYSTEMS BECAUSE SOME HAVE ELEMENTS WHICH MAY BE USED HARMLESSLY FOR OTHER ACTIVITIES. THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM IS TO IDENTIFY VERIFIABLE ACTIONS OF ELIMINATION SO THAT NO ASAT SYSTEM WILL EXIST, BUT SELECTED SO AS NOT TO DO UNNECESSARY VIOLENCE TO OTHER SYSTEMS. DEVELOPMENT OF A LIST OF STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO ELIMINATE AN EXISTING ASAT SYSTEM COULD MOST REASONABLY BEGIN WITH A PROPOSAL FROM THE SIDE POSSESSING THE SYSTEM, TO BE ACCEPTED OR AMENDED IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SIDES.

10. KHESTOV ASKED "DO YOU MEAN ONLY SPACE OBJECTS WHICH ARE INTENDED FOR ASAT USE OR ALSO LAUNCH FACILITIES WHICH SERVE AND MAINTAIN SUCH SPECIAL SPACE OBJECTS; ALSO, RADIO TECHNICAL MEANS WHICH ARE USED EVEN IF FOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES IN SPACE?"

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 156354

BUCHHEIM REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT MEAN SIMPLY SPACE OBJECTS INVOLVED IN CARRYING OUT HOSTILE ACTS. WE DO MEAN LAUNCHING MEANS AND LAUNCH VEHICLES WHICH ARE FOR THAT PURPOSE. ON THINGS LIKE RADIO TECHNICAL MEANS, WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS WHATEVER IS NOT REASONABLE BASED ON DEGREE OF GENERALITY OF USE AND IMPORTANCE TO THE ASAT SYSTEM. OUR GENERAL ANSWER IS THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ELIMINATE COMPONENT ITEMS TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO ASSURE THAT THE SYSTEM NO LONGER EXISTS. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO ELIMINATE ASAT SYSTEMS, AND NOT TO DEMAND UNREASONABLE THINGS. IF THE TWO SIDES ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT AND A SOVIET ASAT SYSTEM WERE THE FIRST TO BE ELIMINATED, IT WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO PROPOSE VERIFIABLE SETS OF COMPONENT ACTIONS WHICH WOULD SERVE THAT PURPOSE AND WHICH WOULD BE BEARABLE TO YOU. WE MIGHT SUGGEST ADDITIONAL OR ALTERNATIVE ACTION. I CANNOT BE MORE PRECISE; I CANNOT DESCRIBE THE END RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE NOT YET STARTED. THE BASIC ELEMENTS ARE THAT THE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN SHOULD BE: (1) OF SUFFICIENT EXTENT TO SATISFY THE OTHER SIDE THAT THE ASAT SYSTEM HAS BEEN ELIMINATED; (2) VERIFIABLE; (3) VERIFIABLE THROUGH MEANS AND MEASURES AGREED UPON; (4) NO MORE DETRIMENTAL TO OTHER ACTIVITIES THAN NECESSARY. IT MAY BE THAT IN SOME CASES THE APPROPRIATE STEPS WOULD INCLUDE ELIMINATION OF THE SPACE OBJECT COMPONENT. IN OTHER CASES, OTHER ACTS OF ELIMINATION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE, PERHAPS NOT INCLUDING A SPACE OBJECT COMPONENT. WE ARE NOT ABLE TO GIVE A GENERAL ANSWER. SOME KINDS OF ASAT SYSTEMS MAY NOT INVOLVE SPACE OBJECTS AT ALL. THE REQUIRED ACTION CANNOT BE PRESCRIBED IN ADVANCE FOR ALL FUTURE CASES, AND WOULD HAVE TO BE SPECIFIED FOR EACH TYPE OF SYSTEM. THEY WOULD DEPEND ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF ELIMINATION, MEANS OF VERIFICATION, AND EFFECT ON OTHER TYPES OF

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 156354

ACTIVITIES.

11. KHESTOV ASKED WHAT IS THE US VIEW ON EARTH-BASED FACILITIES WHICH INDIRECTLY PARTICIPATE IN HOSTILE ACTS? BUCHHEIM SAID THAT ELIMINATING THOSE WOULD BE AN OBVIOUS WAY OF DISESTABLISHING A SYSTEM IF THEY HAVE NO OTHER FUNCTION. KHESTOV SAID "YOU

INDICATED THAT THERE ARE SPECIAL EARTH-BASED SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST SPACE OBJECTS." BUCHHEIM SAID "I DON'T, THERE MAY BE." KHLESTOV ASKED "WHAT ABOUT EARTH-BASED FACILITIES USED NOT ONLY FOR LAUNCHING OBJECTS FOR DAMAGING SPACE OBJECTS BUT ALSO FOR OTHER ACTIVITIES IN SPACE. BUCHHEIM SAID IT IS BETTER NOT TO TRY TO PRESCRIBE A GENERAL ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION. THERE MAY BE, IN SOME CASES, OTHER STEPS WITH A COMPARABLE EFFECTIVENESS IN ELIMINATING THE SYSTEM, BUT WHICH WOULD NOT DAMAGE OTHER ACTIVITIES.

12. BUCHHEIM SAID THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN EXPERIMENTING WITH AN ASAT SYSTEM. IF WE NOW HAD IN PLACE A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT REQUIRING ELIMINATION OF THAT SYSTEM, WHAT WOULD THE SOVIET SIDE SUGGEST BE DONE BY THE USSR SO THAT THE SYSTEM WOULD NO LONGER EXIST? WHAT ACTIONS OF ELIMINATION WOULD YOU PROPOSE THAT WOULD NOT INTERFERE UNREASONABLY WITH YOUR OTHER SPACE ACTIVITIES? KHLESTOV SAID THE USSR UNDERSTANDS WHAT THE US WANTS BY A PROHIBITION ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT. I CAN ONLY ANSWER THAT WE CAN NOW SEE A QUICK AND EASY STEP, WHICH IS AN OBLIGATION PROHIBITING HOSTILE ACTS. THE USSR PROPOSES TO ALSO GO ALONG THE WAY OF WORKING OUT AN UNDERSTANDING PROHIBITING DEVELOPMENT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 156354

AND DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS. THE USSR WANTS TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE US MEANS, BUT I AM NOT CAPABLE OF ANSWERING NOW. KHLESTOV ASKED TO WHAT DEGREE IS SUCH A TASK REALISTIC? IT IS MORE REASONABLE TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON A MATTER ON WHICH OUR VIEWS ARE CLOSE.

13. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM KHLESTOV ABOUT THE MEANING OF DEVELOPMENT, BUCHHEIM SAID THAT BY DEVELOPMENT WE MEAN ALL THE STEPS IN THE PROCESS FROM AN IDEA TO THE EXISTENCE OF A FUNCTIONING SYSTEM. HE SAID WE ASSUME THAT THE PURPOSE OF SOVIET ASAT TESTS HAS BEEN TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT; AND, IF NOT, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN DOING.

14. KHLESTOV ASKED IF AN EARTH-BASED FACILITY FOR LAUNCHING AN OBJECT, NOT NECESSARILY FOR ASAT, IS USED BOTH FOR SPECIALIZED ASAT PURPOSES AND ALSO FOR NON-ASAT PURPOSES, WOULD IT FALL UNDER THE OBLIGATION? BUCHHEIM SAID THAT ANY EARTH-BASED FACILITIES FOR BOTH PURPOSES MUST BE DEALT WITH AS A SPECIFIC CASE.

15. THE PLENARY ADJOURNED AFTER FOUR HOURS. THE
NEXT SESSION IS SCHEDULED FOR THURSDAY, JUNE 15.
FRY. UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SURVEILLANCE SATELLITES, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE156354
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/SOV:ABOHLEN
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780257-0667
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780639/aaaabhql.tel
Line Count: 444
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 3e934685-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 08 mar 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2277121
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ASAT TALKS: FOURTH PLENARY, JUNE 14, 1978 SUMMARY. AT FOURTH PLENARY, BUCHHEIM SAID US BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO WORK OUT TWO-PART UN
TAGS: PARM
To: MOSCOW
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3e934685-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014